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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses the discursive nexus of ‘the people’ drawing from the mediatisation and 
institutionalisation of Brexit. It focuses on how metadiscourses of popular sovereignty have been 
instrumental in the legitimation of Brexit and on how such discourses are now more widely echoed in 
different populist and nativist political projects across Europe that are seeking consensus through a 
delegitimation of the EU. The discussion draws attention to the emergence of counter discourses of the 
people but also to the structural conditions that prevent or limit the consolidation of robust transnational 
forms of European citizenry. This scenario will arguably define the next European elections as a critical 
juncture where the legitimacy of the European project will be contested in the name of different ‘peoples’ 
and ‘values’.  
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The European project and the people at a critical legitimacy juncture 
The European project stands at a critical juncture. In the last decade, there has been a gradual shift from 
‘permissive consensus’ - whereby citizens have accepted further integration while showing low levels of 
political involvement - to an overt legitimation challenge of the European project (see, for example, 
Hooghe and Marks, 2009; Bouza and Oleart, 2018). This challenge has been largely compounded by a 
complex interaction between financial and social crises and has been articulated along different discursive 
axes, not least in the recent surge of populist and sovereignist discourses that have increasingly brought the 
people to the forefront of such legitimation struggle. 
For sure, the people has always been a key discursive element of political processes. The term has been 
invoked by all democratic and populist narratives and it has often been politically mobilised for different 
projects. In this sense the idea of the people, albeit inevitably semantically vague, is a powerful one which, 
since the volonté générale (the will of the people) celebrated by the French Revolution, has been widely 
taken for granted as the basis of legitimacy in any modern democratic system. The idea of the ‘will of the 
people’ moving up the metaphorical chain of legitimacy to be exercised at the national level by citizens’ 
representatives and through nationally organized institutions is a well established tenet of constitutional 
democracies (Schneider et al. 2016). However, in relation to a wider conceptualization of the EU and its 
member states as organized along a national/transnational hierarchy, such metaphorical chain of legitimacy 
has been at its weakest in enabling the transfer of power from the nation to the EU (Nulmeier and Pritzlaff, 
2010). So while a European demos has, at best, only manifested in embryonic forms (Zappettini, 2017; 
Zappettini, 2019a) we are now increasingly seeing an overt challenge to any transnational form of 
legitimacy of the European project coming from bottom up. This ideological struggle is likely to 
consolidate and to polarize discourses of the people in the forthcoming election for the European 
Parliament in May 2019. 
This paper discusses the current legitimation struggle from the ontological perspective that the people as a 
political subject does not exist a priori but it is constituted in and through discourse (Laclau, 2005). As a 
way of example, I will first focus on the ideological and discursive arena of Brexit to show how populist 
discourses have been key in the unfolding of Brexit and how evoking the people has been instrumental in 
its mediatisation and institutionalisation (see Zappettini and Krzyzanowski, 2019 and articles in the Special 
Issue ‘Brexit as a Social & Political Crisis: Discourses in Media & Politics’ in Critical Discourse Studies 
(2019:4) for an extensive discussion of these dimensions). Following this, I will briefly discuss potential 
wider implications of Brexit for the European project in light of populist movements and the forthcoming 
elections of the European Parliament. 
 
BREXIT AS A DISCURSIVE CHAIN OF LEGITIMACY 
The critical juncture of Brexit   
 
The etiology of Brexit has been widely discussed from a variety of perspectives. In this paper, I draw from 
an interpretation of Brexit as the accumulation of path-dependent historical discourses and socio-political 
contingencies (Zappettini and Krzyzanowski, 2019) that has been instrumental in building up and 
sustaining a legitimacy chain of public and institutional discourses. Taking a critical-discursive stance, 
Zappettini and Krzyzanowski (2019) contend that Brexit represents a ‘critical juncture in the making’ and 
that the Brexit referendum was the result of  
“different historical and contingent discursive nexuses and trajectories … [and] a variety of context-
dependent, ideologically-driven social, political and economic imaginaries that were attached to the 
idea/concept of Brexit” 
Among such discursive trajectories one must consider historical forms of Euroscepticism - in some cases 
rooted in British imperialism, see Maccaferri (2019) - as well as contingent forms of political opportunism 
whereby the Prime Minister David Cameron aimed to solve the ongoing ‘question’ of Europe inside the 
Conservative Party by calling a referendum in 2016 on whether the United Kingdom should leave or 
remain in the European Union. As Zappettini and Krzyzanowski (2019) argue, different ‘imaginaries’ were 
associated with the signifier Brexit in the simplistic antagonism of the in/out referendum binaries. In a 
sense, the institutionalisation of the ‘European question’ into the referendum options framed the 
Leave/Remain binary choices as floating signifiers that the two opposed camps could fill with specific 
ideological signifieds/meanings (Zappettini, 2019b). For example, Brexit was represented by the Leave 
campaign as an ‘escape route’ for Britain “from an ‘unavoidable’ supranational path inside the EU back to 
a ‘safer’ (inter)national system of relations” (Zappettini and Krzyzanowski, 2019). At the same time, 
however, “the Leave campaign ‘take back control’ slogan often represented a floating signifier that 
instrumentally legitimised both a logic of global deceleration rejecting neoliberalism and austerity […] 
and a logic of global acceleration advocating further liberalisation and international free trade” 
(Zappettini and Krzyzanowski, 2019: see also Zappettini, 2019b for further arguments of trade and 
mercantile logics as well as the moral panic over immigration).  
Significantly, discourses that had circulated on the fringe of politics (and consolidated primarily within the 
UKIP party) were allowed to become semi-institutionalised through the referendum set up and 
subsequently taken up in the public sphere and at an institutional level. Since the referendum result, we 
have seen for example how certain discourses related to free trade escalated and were rapidly seized upon 
by the Government to construct the rhetoric of ‘Global Britain’. As I have discussed elsewhere (Zappettini, 
2019c) the trope of ‘Global Britain’ has become a catalyst around which different legitimising narratives of 
Brexit as rupture and continuity with the ‘continent’ (or, contradictorily both) have been articulated as the 
‘bottom logics’ of Britain leaving the EU.  
Krzyżanowski and Zappettini (2019) also point to the unfolding of political crises (both external and 
internal to the UK - see also Bennet, 2019 and  Krzyżanowski, 2019) – and different populist and 
nationalist ideologies (see also Tolson, 2019; Ruzza and Pejovic, 2019) as a powerful discursive drivers 
through which the critical juncture of Brexit has been constructed. I will discuss these dynamics in the 
following section with specific reference to their discursive normalisation and the role of the media.  
The politicization and mediatization of Brexit and the people1  
The discursive node of the people has been a key tool in the legitimacy chain of Brexit. For example, as the 
early Brexit referendum polls were announced on the morning of 24th June 2016 UKIP’s leader Nigel 
Farage claimed the Leave victory with the follow statement "this will be a victory for real people, a victory 
for ordinary people, a victory for decent people” (The Independent, 24/6/2016). Similarly, the British 
Government has discursively appropriated the result of an advisory referendum where 37% of all potential 
voters chose to Leave the EU as a mandate to implement Brexit (however unclear its form still is) by 
legitimizing it as the ‘will of the people’ (and through the tautology of ‘Brexit means Brexit’).  
Through this typical argumentum ad populum different meanings of Brexit have been retrofitted to an 
imagined volonté générale expressed by what effectively was a minority of citizens, but which, 
nevertheless has been discursively constructed as a homogeneous monolith. As the discursive articulation 
of the will of the people has gone up the institutional chain it has sustained and legitimized harder forms of 
Brexit for example through the argument that ‘the British people have spoken’ and the Government must 
deliver for them (Patel, 2016 reported in Freeden, 2017) and amidst warnings that any legal scrutiny over 
the process is “an attempt to frustrate the will of the British people” (Javid, 2016 reported in Freeden, 2017) 
and that Brexit could be ‘stolen from the people’ by its very own MPs (The Guardian, 5/12/18). 
In addition to and arguably in synergy with the institutional legitimisation of Brexit in the name of the 
people, one must also consider the role played by the media, in framing the debate in the run up to the 
referendum and afterwards. One can hardly overstate the media’s ability to instigate public debates by 
setting the news agenda along populist logics. While this can be a force for good when the ‘fourth estate’ 
performs its function of democratic guardian in a pluralised public sphere, the media’s power can equally 
serve commercial logics and a newspaper’s own political and ideological agendas. News is not simply 
circulated in/by the media but that it can also be actively framed through a newspaper’s ideological lens. 
Few examples of the instrumental role of the press in constructing public perceptions could be more 
relevant than how the British tabloids have historically covered the EU-UK relationship and, more recently, 
Brexit. The British tabloid press has a long tradition of Eurosceptic to Europhobic editorial stances, 
including the promotion of various ‘crusades’ around different Euro-myths and infamous headlines such as 
the Sun’s ‘Up yours Delors’. Overall, tabloids have been responsible for the trivialisation (some would call 
it ‘tabloidization’) of European politics, a process that most certainly has contributed to the British written 
press being considered as the least trusted in Europe (Press Gazette, 2017). For years, titles such as The 
Daily Mail, the Sun and The Daily Express have been particularly active in portraying the UK as a victim 
of a Brussels ‘cosmopolitical’ conspiracy plot that, according to some headlines, would result for example 
in the British Parliament being forced to adopt bans on traditional British kettles and light bulbs to comply 
with EU rules (see the EU Commission’s myth-debunking website for a full list). 
                                                     
1 Parts of this section have been reproduced in the following blogs:  
Zappettini, F. (2019). From Euroscepticism to outright populism: the evolution of British tabloids. London 
School of Economics Blog on Brexit. Available from: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2019/01/04/from-
euroscepticism-to-outright-populism-the-evolution-of-british-tabloids/ 
Zappettini, F. (2019). How Tabloids Were Able To Frame The Debate Over Brexit. European Journalism 
Observatory. Available from: https://en.ejo.ch/media-politics/how-tabloids-were-able-to-frame-the-debate-
over-brexit 
 
As most tabloids entered coverage of the Brexit referendum campaign as prominent advocates of the Leave 
side (with the exception of labour-friendly Daily Mirror, the Mail on Sunday, which took an opposite 
stance to its daily sister publication, and the politically disengaged Daily Star) they could therefore bank on 
an established priming of their audiences through which they had already been able to effectively pre-
legitimise Brexit even before the referendum was called. What we saw during the referendum campaign 
was a de facto consolidation of such populist discourses (Zappettini, 2018). Here, I use the term populist 
(an otherwise much debated proposition between academics) in its basic meaning i.e. referring to the 
people (see for example Laclau, 2005; Canovan, 2005). Of course, in most political discourses the term 
‘people’ tends to be invariably invoked in semantically vague and rhetorical ways. But what makes a 
populist discourse different from a democratic one is that the former portrays the people in opposition to its 
imagined enemies and typically in exclusionary rather than inclusionary terms. As an ‘imagined 
community’ (Anderson, 2016) the British nation had to reify its ‘imagined enemies’ both externally - in the 
EU as a dominant power - and internally as the ‘corrupt’ elites, etc. supporting the European project. 
 
 
A linguistic analysis of how the term ‘(the) people’ was used in a corpus of tabloids during the referendum 
campaign, suggests that the language of tabloids has been consistent with such populist views of the world 
in binary terms (Zappettini, 2018). Throughout the campaign, tabloids typically tended to portray the 
‘British people’ (sometimes also qualified as ‘ordinary’ or ‘hard-working’ people) as a distinct group who 
were antagonised by other groups of ‘people’ who, in turn, were often characterised as either (EU) migrants 
and ‘free to move’ to the UK or as ‘detached’ elites. The tabloid press further identified the latter as 
international (e.g. EU, Brussels, Eurocrats, the IMF, President Obama) or domestic (e.g. Westminster, 
‘experts’ and Remainers) enemies of the ‘British people’. These characterisations played a pivotal role in 
how tabloids were able to frame the debate over the Brexit referendum around typical populist dynamics. 
Notably, the coverage tapped into the politics of loss and resentment over migration through arguments of 
social pressure and resources sharing, but also through arguments of risk and security which, in some cases, 
straddled into explicit xenophobic moral panic. For example, The Daily Express on 6th June 2016 reported 
Nigel Farage’s comment that mass sex attacks like those that had happened in Cologne would occur in the 
UK unless the country voted to leave. Similarly, in relation to the pitting of the ‘ordinary British people’ 
against the elites, the dominant dynamic in the corpus analysed was one of reaffirming a sense of national 
pride akin to the defiant sovereignism that has characterised recent Euroscepticism across many 
democracies. Standing up to the ‘bullying’ of the IMF, of Remainers David Cameron and George Osborne, 
or the EU ‘corrupt’ bureaucrats was common currency in many Daily Mail articles, for example. 
A key point worth making here is that tabloids did not simply act as communicative platforms by 
amplifying (or silencing) the main actors and arguments of the referendum campaign but, rather, that they 
effectively (de)legitimised Brexit along a populist logic as well as according to their own ideological 
agenda. Furthermore, one should not see this populist thrust limited to the contingency of the Brexit 
referendum campaign. As I have argued above, a large section of the British press has had a historical role 
in producing anti-EU propaganda based on spurious news and anti-foreign sentiment. Plenty of evidence 
suggests that this historical path has not stopped with the referendum result but, in fact, that the populist 
thrust has steadily driven the post-referendum coverage of Brexit. Appeals to the ‘people’s will’ (and 
delegitimisation of supporters of softer or no Brexit as ‘enemies of the people’) have been key drivers of 
public and institutional discourses. The longer-term coverage of Euronews in the tabloid press and the 
populist discursive articulation of Brexit have been instrumental in creating the chain of legitimation that 
has institutionalised extreme Eurosceptic discourses that originally emerged on the fringe of the British 
political spectrum and now seem to be at the core of the implementation of Brexit. Right-wing tabloids 
have been key in close down any dissent to softer forms of Brexit, for example through the characterization 
of any opposition as ‘betrayal of the people’ and of such opponents as ‘enemies of the people’ (see for 
example The Daily Mail). Of course, the term ‘people’ has equally been appropriated by other actors to 
construct counter-discourses for example around the ‘peoples’ vote’ referendum. At the moment, this 
seems to be the extremely volatile nodal point where the struggle over the Brexit debate is taking place as 
we come up to the expected Brexit date (29th March 2019). 
 
Wider implications of Brexit and the articulation of the people for the European project 
 
Anticipating what the long term ramifications of Brexit will be for member states and EU politics is just as 
difficult as predicting any further development of Brexit in British domestic politics. However, in relation 
to the former, two opposite discursive trends seem to have been playing out on the European political stage. 
On the one hand, the immediate ‘domino effect’ that some had envisaged happening in the immediate 
aftermath of Brexit has not materialized. Indeed, for governments and other political actors in many EU 
member states, rather than representing a political model, Brexit seems to have acted as a warning on the 
consequences of playing into sovereignist discourses and it is arguably deterring the many anticipated 
‘exits’ (e.g. Frexit, Swexit, etc.). For example, the Swedish Left Party is dropping its long-standing quest to 
leave the EU and Italian Five-Star Movement has been increasingly shying away from its early day’s 
flagship policy of calling for a referendum on Italy exiting the Euro which helped paving its way into the 
Government coalition with Lega. On the other hand, however, the question of the people and their values 
remains highly mobilised across Europe. Undoubtedly, public and political discourses that invoke the 
people have increasingly become common currency  and are seized upon by different far-right political 
projects whether it be Sweden’s Democrats, Italian Lega, French Front National, Dutch Partij voor de 
Vrijheid, German Alternative für Deutschland, Finland’s True Finns, Spain’s Vox, etc. These discourse are 
likely to escalate in the run up to the European Elections in May 2019 since votes for the Euro Parliament 
tend to be instrumentally used as protest platforms as exemplified by the case of UKIP topping the last EP 
election in 2013. Here, again, we are seeing another critical juncture in the making as, if predictions have it 
right, both the two major political families in the Strasbourg (the European People's Party and the European 
Socialist Party) are expected to lose some of their current seats and, for the first time, this election will see 
neither of them having a clear majority (Schaart, 2019). This will mean that new alliances and balances 
within and across groups will have to be sought at a time when soverignist parties are expected to increase 
their seats. It is also unclear whether such sovereignist will consolidate into a homogenous alternative 
coalition capable of undermining the Europeanist front. There has been much speculation over what might 
be shaping up as the ‘peoples of Europe’ umbrella, a coalition supported by Trump's former chief strategist, 
Steve Bannon’s new foundation ("The Movement“) whose explicit aim is to dismantle the EU and restore 
‘traditional’ values (Cerulus, 2018). This could lead to the paradoxical situation where parties which found 
their legitimacy on discourses of national sovereignty will Trojan-horse supranational institutions in order 
to delegitimise them. Even if the alleged umbrella of sovereignist parties does not consolidate as predicted, 
some impact from sovereignist parties is expected on the European balance of power as, for example, a 
shift could occur in the presidency of the Europarliament and the Commission towards figures more 
ideologically sympathetic to populist moods. In this scenario, according to Soros (2019) “the cleavage that 
matters most today is no longer between capital and labour but between pro- and anti-European forces”. 
Meanwhile, however, a transnational conceptualization of the people that could counteract soverignist 
discourses is struggling to emerge due to a series of weak structural conditions and the self-reinforcing 
nature of national discourses. So what are the opportunities and the limitations for a non-national 
conceptualization of the people? Of course Europe cannot be defined in culturally and ethnically 
homogenous terms and the European people can only be conceived of as a transnational demos, that is a 
civic community beyond national remits. But, so far  the European demos has been weak (some would say 
hardly existent) for a number of reasons. For example, a truly transnational European Public Sphere is still 
underdeveloped as European elections campaigns are still framed around nationally domesticated themes 
and participation is weak as elections for the European Parliament are seen as ‘second order’ elections 
(Reif and Schmitt, 1997). The nation is still a key actor in the EU system; for example formal EU 
citizenship relies on national citizenship in the first place and the Council, which is still a key player in 
decisions making, will prioritise national interests ‘by default’. Moreover, we see national discourses and 
national structures mutually reinforcing each other. For example a strong discursive naturalisation exists 
that equates popular sovereignty with national sovereignty. These discourses are constantly being 
reproduced. For example, the 73 British EP seats that will be no longer available following the UK’s 
expected departure from the EU will be redistributed nationally to other countries as the proposal to use 
these seats to create transnational lists was voted down (Barbière, 2018). Whilst this could have been an 
opportunity for transnationalising and deterritorialising EP voting system by allowing EU citizens to vote 
beyond their national constituencies, one could argue that the ‘British people’ have symbolically been 
renationalised under different country labels. 
A true reconfiguration of the concepts of the people and their sovereignty is a nodal point that should really 
be addressed by an agenda of European reforms. As Habermas (quoted in von Bogdandy, 2013) has argued 
“we cannot just project the familiar national design of liberal institutions onto the supranational level. The 
same principles, if they ever can be implemented on a global scale, will assume a different institutional 
format”.  If we think of popular sovereignty as separate from national sovereignty (the latter being a much 
more modern concept) maybe we can conceive of popular sovereignty at the European level. But how 
could such European popular sovereignty be achieved and legitimised? Answering these questions is 
clearly beyond the scope of this paper but some suggestions that have been put forward both at top-down 
and bottom-up levels are worth exploring and pursuing. At an institutional level, for example, we can think 
of greater role for European Parliament as the legitimate sovereign body. For example, French President 
Emmanuel Macron (reported in Banks and Levy-Abegnoli, 2018) floated these ideas by stating:  “The 
European Parliament should elect and control a European government. Every European Commissioner has 
to convince people by running for the European parliamentary elections.”  
In public discourse, transnational and deterritorialised ideas of people (Zappettini, 2017; 2019) can be 
promoted as well as representations of citizens over peoples. This could lead to a transnationalised and 
deterritorialised understanding of the European demos and arguably promote a voting system whereby EU 
citizens were allowed to vote beyond their national constituencies based on European programmes rather 
than specific national agendas. In addition, from a bottom up perspective, we can encourage active 
citizenship (‘imagining’ and ‘doing’ Europe) where European identities would emerge within a networked 
community and through engagement, participation and investment with Europe as a democratic project 
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